RESOLVE || Reports & Manuscripts || Alternative Dispute Resolution in the NEPA Process

The emphasis and objectives of the decision making process prescribed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the processes generally associated with alternative dispute resolution (ADR), when applied to environmental issues, are very similar. Both are designed to 1) provide improved exchange of relevant information, communications and trust among affected parties; 2) better informed decision making; 3) greater acceptance and therefore "staying power" of decisions; and 4) decreased likelihood of costly and lengthy litigation. However, despite the complimentary aspects of NEPA and ADR, this linkage does not seem to have been widely identified or utilized. More specific attention to the application of ADR techniques to the NEPA process, through increased awareness of proven ADR techniques and the use of neutral facilitators or mediators where appropriate, would enhance the ability of agencies to use the NEPA process as the decision making tool it was intended to be rather than the onerous procedural burden it seems to have become.

One hundred and twelve lawsuits were filed under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1992, the most recent year for which data is available. Dinah Bear, General Council of the Council on Environmental Quality, points out that "litigation is ....a major factor in agency NEPA implementation strategies, executive branch policy considerations and in the Justice Department’s litigation load." During the fiscal years 1991 to 1993 NEPA litigation accounted for 18.9% of Department of Justice trial attorneys’ time and 14% of the appellate division’s time.

Although many seek to avoid the high transaction costs associated with such litigation, it ought not be forgotten that litigation is both an important tool to bring agencies into procedural compliance with NEPA. It is often seen as the only tool with which parties can capture serious attention to their concerns over agency decision making. However, the results of litigation under NEPA do not necessarily translate into better decisions or improved environmental protection.

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes have a valuable role to play in complementing NEPA and helping achieve what it is intended to do -- provide for more informed and, therefore, improved public decision making affecting the environment. The thoughtful application of ADR techniques to decision making under NEPA has the potential to focus energies on the substantive issues of concern early in the process, thereby decreasing the likelihood that issues of procedural compliance will be used as a means of blocking or delaying the implementation of decisions that are substantively unsatisfactory to one or more interested parties. Where legal action is initiated because the decisions being taken are, or are perceived to be, harmful to the interests or concerns of certain stakeholder groups, ADR processes ought also to help settle and, thereby, decrease the amount of NEPA-based litigation.

Throughout the NEPA process there are points at which the thoughtful application of ADR techniques could enhance the NEPA process and increase the likelihood that decision making under NEPA is durable. ADR techniques lend themselves to productive handling of both existing controversies and contemplated actions for which the potential for controversy is anticipated. To help identify where and how NEPA might most effectively benefit from considered use of alternative dispute resolution processes, it is useful to think through parallels from the negotiated rulemaking process, an area where ADR techniques have been deliberately and successfully applied to agency decision making in the regulatory arena.

What is Alternative Dispute Resolution?

The phrase alternative dispute resolution is used to describe a broad category of approaches, with which the parties to disputes voluntarily seek to achieve a settlement of the issues. Most are "consensual" in nature, meaning that the goal is a voluntary agreement, or consensus on an action to be taken. Some approaches, such as dialogue and negotiation, are processes of direct communication between parties. Facilitation and mediation are terms for the assistance of a neutral person in such dialogue or negotiation efforts. Arbitration, both binding and non-binding, is an alternative dispute resolution process in which the neutral is asked to hear facts and render an opinion concerning the terms of settlement. Although infrequently used in environmental matters, other litigation-related settlement procedures include settlement conferences, early neutral evaluation, and mini-trials.

Generally, alternative dispute resolution processes share several characteristics that can help shape strategies for using them successfully. Four in particular are key:

First, it is important to remember and preserve the voluntary nature of these processes. Parties have a choice both about whether to participate in a consensus-building process and about whether to concur in a proposed course of action. Understanding this leads to greater attention to building on relevant incentives for parties to participate and, later, to reach agreements. This helps to ensure that consensus-building is genuinely more likely to produce positive results for all parties than will confrontation in other forums.

Second, alternative dispute resolution processes all involve direct communication between stakeholders. Ultimately, successful resolution of issues requires stakeholders to exchange information, understand one anther’s interests and concerns, and develop options that address these concerns -- in other words, to persuade one another to accept a proposed course of action. Basic principles of successful negotiation are essentially the principles of good communication -- ask questions, listen carefully, focus on interests not positions.

Third, ADR processes are inherently flexible. Although mediation is a definable process, rarely are any two mediation processes alike. During initial consultations on whether parties are willing to participate in a mediated negotiation, questions about how the process will be conducted are often key. Clearly, who will participate, what the scope of issues (and alternatives) will be, whether meetings will be open to the public or closed, what deadlines apply, and what the consequences will be if an agreement is reached, are all issues that link directly to parties’ incentives to participate. One of the most important advantages of an ADR process is its flexibility to respond to the unique obstacles to agreement in each particular situation, whether that be a large number of parties, scientific uncertainty in predicting environmental effects, a long history of polarization or high level of political scrutiny.

Finally, ADR processes seek to create as level a playing field as possible. Mediators not only must refrain from taking positions that side with one party or another as part of their commitment to neutrality, but they must assess whether the fundamental assumptions structuring the process are detrimental to any party’s interest. Such assumptions must be made sufficiently open that parties either can work together to change them or, if that is not possible, knowledgeably assess their risks. This is critical not only to the credibility of the process over the long run but also to whether sufficient incentives will exist for all parties such that the process will be worthwhile in the first place.

History of ADR in Environmental Matters

Mediation was first formally employed to help settle a long-standing environmental dispute in the early 1970s. Since that time, the practice has grown steadily and results have been demonstrated in widely diverse situations. In the first decade of experience with environmental mediation, agreements were reached in approximately 78 percent of the nearly 200 hundred cases documented, with no significant difference in success by the type of issues involved, whether they be air, water, land, chemical or waste matters.

The combination of parties to these disputes also has varied considerably, helping change old stereotypes both that disputes have "two sides" and that they are between environmentalists and industries. Mediated negotiations have involved purely intergovernmental parties, such as the Columbia River Estuary Study Task Force in the early 1980s in which the parties were four federal agencies, four state agencies, and four units of local government. Mediated negotiations also have been conducted among purely private parties and between environmental groups. Most commonly, environmental mediation efforts involve multiple agencies of government at multiple levels, including tribal governments; private sector interests, including manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, retail and others; and public interest groups ranging across political perspectives, including consumer, environmental and public health groups at the national, regional or local levels, as well as ad hoc local citizen organizations.

Although most environmental mediation efforts have been convened on a case-by-case basis, beginning in the 1980s efforts have been made to create more routine and systematic use of ADR in public decision making. The Administrative Conference of the United States adopted a resolution in 1982 recommending the use of and procedures for mediated negotiations in the federal rulemaking process. This led to at least nine agencies building a body of experience with negotiated rulemaking on which, in turn, Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 1991 codifying procedures for its effective and appropriate use. In 1991, Congress also passed the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which was a more comprehensive effort to define ADR processes, establish guidance, and encourage their use through the requirement that all agencies identify an ADR official who would have the responsibility for developing a plan for the appropriate use of such processes in that agency. State governments have also played a role in creating more of an institutional framework for ADR in public decision making. Some states have state mediation offices, while others have a variety of statutes encouraging or guiding the use of ADR in particular kinds of disputes (e.g. solid and hazardous waste facility siting).

Given this history and the now possibly thousands of efforts from informal, facilitated workshops to formally mediated negotiations, the question persists as to why there has been interest but little action in integrating ADR into the NEPA process. In 1979 Nicholas C. Yost, then General Counsel at the Council on Environmental Quality, was an early proponent:

Why has this potential not been achieved to the degree hoped? Or has it? Perhaps the level of litigation is not high, if one considers the numbers possible. Many if not most environmental assessments and environmental impact statements do contain relevant information for decision making; most involve a scoping step. It is also possible that the assumptions above are too optimistic (i.e. that good information collection and analysis are enough to avoid conflicts).

Lessons from alternative dispute resolution suggest that how one involves people may also be a factor in NEPA related decisions. The dynamics are very different if an agency, no matter how sincere about the NEPA process, is listening to information and concerns presented but waits until later to consider on its own what action to take than if it is seeking to reach agreements with stakeholders directly. Seeking to reach "agreement on issues to be studied" also may produce different results than seeking agreement on the alternatives to be considered, or on the criteria to be used in choosing among alternatives. The dynamics of seeking agreement on the preferred alternative is likely to produce yet different results again. This is not to recommend one approach over another in all situations, nor even to suggest that these are the only possible variations -- they are not. However, for NEPA to achieve its intended potential, it may be necessary to explore these and other opportunities for enhancing the process beyond more traditional notice and comment processes.

Parallels Between ADR in the Rulemaking and NEPA Processes

Both alternative dispute resolution processes and NEPA were initiated by people with similar goals and objectives in mind. Both represent decision making processes with equivalent goals -- more informed decision making. Two elements are key: 1) structuring the decision making process and 2) providing good information.

The emphasis and objectives of alternative dispute resolution and NEPA are virtually the same. Both champion a process that promises:

ADR and NEPA also follow comparable procedural steps. Differences emerge in how each step is accomplished, who is involved in the process, and who facilitates the process, particularly the extent of reliance on consensus, i.e. who decides. (See Table 1.) In alternative dispute resolution processes, such as negotiated rulemaking, most of the steps are accomplished collectively by the parties or stakeholders. In the NEPA process, stakeholders are involved in the scoping process and in the public comment phase, but are not active participants in information collection and analysis or development and selection of a preferred alternative. This may create a lack of receptivity and "ownership" in the decision that is at the root of many NEPA disputes.

Table 1. Comparison of Negotiated Rulemaking and NEPA Steps and Actors

Negotiated rulemaking represents a deliberate application of ADR techniques to a federal agency decision making process -- in this case the rulemaking process. Experience demonstrates (and the Negotiated Rulemaking statute ensures) that the ADR process supplements not supplants the traditional decision making process. The final decision making authority of the federal agency is not diminished.

A typical negotiated rulemaking process is conducted as follows. The agency responsible for developing a rule seeks the assistance of a neutral convenor in conducting a thorough stakeholder analysis to assess the potential for a successful negotiation process. The neutral interviews a wide range of potentially interested parties to consult with them about who should be involved, the key issues that need to be addressed, and preliminary recommendations regarding the advisability of and approach for moving forward with a negotiation process.

If sufficient agreement exists between the agency and stakeholders about whether and how to proceed, the agency publishes a notice indicating that it is considering the use of a negotiated rulemaking process, describing the interest groups and issues it expects will be involved. The notice invites comments on the proposed process, including appropriate representation and additional issues.

Based on the information gathered in steps 1 and 2, a multi-stakeholder committee is formed (typically a formal chartering process under the Federal Advisory Committee Act -- FACA). The group defines and agrees on procedural protocols, which serve as the groundrules under which it will operate. As required by FACA, all meetings of the group are announced in advance in the Federal Register and are open to the public. Most, if not all, formal negotiated rulemaking processes have utilized the services of a trained facilitator or mediator who plays a neutral role on the substance of negotiations and whose role is to keep the negotiating group focused, productive and moving forward. It is usually desirable to have the person who assisted in the convening stage serve in this capacity, as they will hopefully have developed effective communications and credibility with the parties.

The agency makes it clear from the beginning a) what its role will be in the process (generally an active participant representing its concerns, responsibilities and constraints with regard to the issues at hand), and b) what it is prepared to do with the consensus product, keeping in mind that the agency must be part of the consensus. The agency usually agrees to use the substantive agreement of the group as the basis for a proposed rulemaking. In many cases, the group develops actual draft rule language; in others in reaches an agreement in principle, which is then drafted by the agency.

When agreement is reached, the agency publishes the consensus-based proposed rule as it would in a traditional rulemaking process and public comment is invited. Because the key interested parties have been involved in the development of the rule, the number of objecting comments tends to be less than in traditional rulemaking.

Applications of ADR to the NEPA Process

What specifically should be the goal, and where in the NEPA process should ADR be targeted to maximize its contribution? The overriding goal, which ADR can assist in achieving, is in meeting NEPA’s objective for an informed decision making process that improves the quality and durability of agency decisions. The other high priority goal for agencies in the application of ADR to NEPA would be to avoid litigation. Yet another important goal may be to provide a potentially more attractive process as an alternative to litigation once a complaint is filed.

An effort to identify where in the NEPA process to apply ADR techniques in order to accomplish theses goals may be informed by looking at the most common reasons for the filing of complaints under NEPA. For 1992, the most recent year for which figures are available, these were:

All of these suggest that significant benefits could be achieved by using ADR in the earliest stages of the NEPA process, when a decision is being made about whether or not to prepare an EA, the scope of issues addressed in an EA, and the subsequent decision regarding the preparation of an EIS and what should be in it. Since each of these involves an agency decision, the extent of buy-in on the part of interest groups to each of these preliminary decisions can have a significant effect on the acceptability of subsequent decisions in the NEPA process.

The underlying concerns in these cases, particularly where plaintiffs claim that an EIS is inadequate, may often be related to a lack of sufficient involvement in or access to the decision making process to ensure that stakeholder concerns are met. The common wisdom that "it must be the right decision if everyone hates it" is an unfortunate perception. Obviously, "win/win" solutions are not always possible, but solutions that solve real problems without creating major new ones are more feasible than commonly expected. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Lake Improvement Plan EIS

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) credited the process by which it involved stakeholders for the successful completion and public acceptance of their findings in the Environmental Impact Statement prepared for their Lake Improvement Plan completed and adopted in 1991. The process produced a plan that successfully addressed issues of water quality, flood control, recreation, and hydropower production, and effectively defused highly controversial policy debates regarding reservoir operating priorities that had divided agency staff and impaired TVA’s relations with key stakeholders.

TVA purposefully set out to use the NEPA process as a decisionmaking tool rather than an add-on to an agency decisionmaking exercise. They went beyond the minimum requirements for public involvement in a creative and expanded scoping process that included 11 public meetings as well as planning meetings with representatives of key interest groups. Through this process TVA staff was able to share the identification of key issues and concerns and the brainstorming of creative options with the public and key interest groups. The scoping process flowed naturally into the development of alternatives for the EIS which was ultimately received without controversy. While this was not a not a formal consensus process, TVA effectively applied ADR principles early and throughout the NEPA process to ensure the integration of public concerns and values in their Lake Management Plan.

TVA found that they were able to use the framework provided by NEPA to support a level playing field on which all interested parties and individuals could voice their views and hear those of others, and could work together to develop options to address their concerns. In accepting an award for this project, TVA Water Resources Projects Manager Christopher Ungate remarked that this process had been "designed not just to comply with NEPA but to achieve its purpose".

Integrating alternative dispute resolution processes into the EIS preparation process when the agency anticipates a high level on controversy -- collaboratively defining the issues to be addressed (in scoping), identifying alternatives, and selecting the preferred alternative (development of an EIS) -- creates the potential for a truly joint problem solving process that would enhance NEPA’s potential to promote better decision making and better decisions. In such cases, an agency might consider the possibility of initiating a formal process, akin to the negotiated rulemaking process, for involving stakeholders in the development of alternatives to be considered, or in the development and prioritization of criteria to be used in choosing among alternatives. In one example, the San Diego County Water Authority asked a mediator to convene a group, the Emergency Water Storage Working Committee, to build consensus on the criteria for siting a reservoir. The results of the committee’s work were tied into the alternatives considered in the environmental assessment done pursuant to that state’s NEPA equivalent.

In cases where the degree of interest or potential controversy is uncertain or believed to be low, early, two-way consultation with stakeholders with a degree of formality appropriate to the particular situation, could help provide acceptance of agency decisions regarding the development and content of an EA and, in the event of a finding no significant impact (FONSI), the decision not to prepare an EIS.

Finally, alternative dispute resolution processes may be useful once a complaint has been filed on NEPA grounds in an effort to settle the litigation. This might involve referral to the Council on Environmental Quality for informal mediation, early neutral evaluation for questions of law, settlement conferences, or suggested referral to a mediator by the Department of Justice.

Barriers/Challenges

Five key barriers or challenges to integrating alternative dispute resolution into the NEPA process deserve attention:

Lack of commitment to NEPA goals. While many value the benefits of the NEPA process, too often agencies have focused on the procedural requirements of NEPA -- particularly those aspects associated with the preparation of environmental impact statements -- rather than on NEPA as a tool for rational and defensible decisionmaking. This is not surprising, given the emphasis the courts have placed on procedural compliance. The emphasis on procedural issues distracts agency decision makers from considering and applying ADR techniques that would improve the effectiveness of the decisionmaking tool at their disposal, perhaps with the concern that ADR process would simply establish one more set of procedural hurdles.

Hesitancy to involve others in decisionmaking . Another reaction that can be a barrier to use of ADR is the perception that involving others will require loss of power or authority, or will force unpleasant interaction with project opponents. Experience with negotiated rulemaking and other forms of alternative dispute resolution demonstrate that agencies are not giving up their proper decision making authority -- consensus can’t be reached without the agency’s concurrence. ADR does require interaction with project opponents, however. This is its very purpose! Experience here shows that hostile interactions are more likely when stakeholders are excluded, or only given the minimum opportunity for comment required, than when they are invited into the process as partners. Differences don’t disappear with ADR, but a well constructed process makes the dynamics fundamentally more constructive.

Cost. ADR does require an investment of time and money at the beginning. One hopes that an assessment of benefits for the costs incurred would result in some use of ADR. Still, this can be a real barrier for agencies in budget-conscious times and for some stakeholders. Although the investment of time and money up-front may be difficult to make, it may help prevent even greater costs if a NEPA complaint is filed. Creative institutional management may be needed to achieve long-term cost savings within short-term budget cycles. Realistically, this is made even more difficult by the fact that future litigation costs may be borne by different parts of an agency’s budget or by different agencies entirely. The establishment of an ADR program within the U.S. Department of Justice and in some state Attorney General’s offices, however, suggest that a broad perspective is possible. On a similarly optimistic note, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and others have paid the travel expenses of certain stakeholders to participate in consensus-building processes on policy matters.

Perception of strength (BATNA). Negotiation is a voluntary process. In some circumstances, parties choose not to participate. Generally this can be linked to the incentives for participation. Either, the design of the process isn’t perceived as giving adequate opportunity for a group’s concerns to be addressed, and/or the group may feel that they can win more through litigation. Not all issues can be negotiated, nor should parties be expected to forego appropriate legal recourse. However, frequently opportunities for negotiation are missed. Sometimes the questions for discussion can be creatively reframed based on the parties’ underlying reasons for concern -- how a mine reclamation plan is designed may be the interest behind objections that an EIS should have been filed.

Federal Advisory Committee Act - Currently, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) is perceived as a major obstacle to creative federal agency use of consensus building processes. Passed in 1972, FACA was designed to provide a process by which federal agencies could bring non-federal expertise to bear in agency decisionmaking in such a way that would preclude the disproportionate influence of any one group of interests. FACA requires that 1) the formation of an advisory committee be formally acknowledged in a charter describing its objectives and the scope of its activities; 2) committee membership reflect balanced representation of points of view, and 3) the process under which the committee functions is open, accessible and transparent -- meetings are announced in advance and are open to the public.

By and large these requirements are consistent with what would be considered "good practice" characteristics of consensus building processes. In other words, there is nothing inherent in FACA that is inconsistent with consensus building in most cases. However, in practice, FACA creates additional hurdles. First, the process for chartering a FACA committee can be lengthy and administratively challenging. Some agencies have established procedures for minimizing this administrative burden; others have not. Second, particularly in situations involving local, site-specific discussions (as is often the case under NEPA), FACA may be perceived negatively by potentially involved parties as an attempt to "federalize" a process. Finally, as a budget-cutting measure early in its tenure, the current administration issued Executive Order 5 ordering that the number of Federal Advisory Committees be cut by one third and that demonstration of a "compelling need" be required for chartering any new Committees. E.O. 5 has made it extremely difficult for agencies to obtain a charter for any new Committees. Although subsequently, in Executive Order 14336, the administration encourages agencies to engage in partnering and collaborating with affected parties to develop rules and regulations, the effective use of consensus building processes in compliance with FACA are currently stymied in many agencies. However, it should be noted that the experience of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency with the negotiated rulemaking process has demonstrated that FACA does not have to be the ordeal that many other agencies make it out to be. If the ceiling on FACA charters could be raised or removed by revising or eliminating E.O. 5, the other barriers can be overcome.

Large number of cases (lack of screening criteria). Realistically, the added costs of ADR mean that formal processes can not be used in all of the thousands of decisions for with agencies comply with NEPA through an EA. Theoretically, one would wish to identify early in the process which cases are likely to be vulnerable to later controversy and litigation. However, this isn’t easy. Training of agency staff may be helpful, both in ways to integrate improved communication skills into the routine conduct of environmental assessments and in criteria for determining the suitability of ADR and what form the ADR should take in a given case.

Conclusion

NEPA was designed on the premise that providing a mechanism for a better informed decisionmaking process would result in improved and more viable decisions with respect to actions affecting the environment. It was not intended to be -- as it has become in many cases -- a set of hoops for agencies to jump through after a decision has been made without the benefit of the very process it prescribes. The negotiated rulemaking analogy works, i.e. ADR can strengthen the NEPA process, when the agency wishes to use NEPA to improve the quality of the decision-making process and of the decision made. ADR also can reduce eventual litigation by helping identify issues early, thus giving the agency and stakeholders an opportunity to address them.

References

Bingham, Gail. Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience . The Conservation Foundation, 1986.

Crowfoot, James E. and J.M. Wondolleck. Environmental Disputes: Community Involvement in Conflict Resolution. Island Press, 1990.

Fisher, Roger, William Ury and Bruce Patton. Getting to Yes. Penguin Books, Second edition, 1991.

The Administrative Law Journal: Proceedings of the First Annual Review of the Administrative Process, panel on Alternative Dispute Resolution with Emphasis on Rulemaking Negotiations Vol. 4:83, Spring 1990.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the NEPA Process

Introduction